Part 108 is often described as the rule that will finally allow routine beyond visual line of sight drone operations. While that is technically accurate, it’s only half of the story.
For utility inspection programs, the proposed rule is not simply about allowing an aircraft to fly farther away from its pilot. It could change how operators are approved, how aircraft are qualified and maintained, how low-altitude traffic is managed, how personnel responsibilities are assigned, and how operational data is retained and shared.
At the time of this writing, the rule has moved into the final-rule stage and is under review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. The FAA submitted it for review on July 10, 2026. The final language is not yet public, which means we know the direction of travel, but not every requirement that will ultimately become effective.
That distinction is important. Utilities and inspection contractors should be preparing for these regulatory changes now, but preparation should not be based on the assumption that the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking will become the final rule without modification.
With the pending regulatory release and limited time to make changes at scale, the question is this:
What should utilities and their inspection contractors be doing now to prepare for a regulatory framework expected to materially change their aircraft, personnel, technology, documentation, program requirements, and operating models?
Part 108 Changes More Than Visual Line of Sight
Today, most commercial utility drone work is conducted under Part 107. Operations beyond visual line of sight generally require a waiver or another form of specific FAA authorization. That process has allowed the utility industry to develop increasingly capable BVLOS programs, but it remains dependent on individualized approvals, operating limitations, and supporting safety cases.
Part 108 is intended to move qualifying BVLOS operations from approval by exception toward operation under a defined rule.
That is a significant step, but the proposed framework extends well beyond the elimination of the visual-line-of-sight requirement. It includes operating permits and certificates, operations over people, defined areas of operation, strategic deconfliction, conformance monitoring, low-altitude right-of-way rules, shielded operations, multi-aircraft operations, duty and rest limits, maintenance requirements, airworthiness acceptance, cybersecurity, flight-data reporting, and a separate framework for automated data services under proposed Part 146.
Part 108 also opens the door to a much broader class of aircraft and sensor payloads. Part 107 applies to small uncrewed aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds at takeoff, including everything carried by or attached to the aircraft. The proposed Part 108 framework establishes weight categories of 55 pounds, 110 pounds, and up to 1,320 pounds, depending on the type of operation, operating approval, and associated risk. The 1,320-pound limit also includes anything carried by or attached to the aircraft.
For utility inspections, that creates opportunities that are difficult to achieve within the current small-UAS weight limit. Larger aircraft can support higher-end LiDAR, thermal, hyperspectral, large-format imaging, and integrated sensor packages that have traditionally been carried by helicopters or other crewed aircraft. This does not eliminate aircraft weight as an operational constraint, and not every Part 108 operation would qualify for the maximum weight. It does, however, create a regulatory path for inspection platforms that are less constrained by payload weight, power requirements, endurance, and the compromises that currently come with fitting advanced sensors onto an aircraft designed to remain below 55 pounds.
In other words, the opportunity is routine BVLOS. The tradeoff is a more formal aviation operating structure than most utility drone programs use today.
This is where some of the current discussion misses the point. Part 108 should not be treated as a choice between a Part 107 pilot and a BVLOS aircraft. Many organizations will continue conducting certain work under Part 107, transition other work into Part 108, and use different approval paths based on the risk and complexity of the operation.
Having a capable aircraft will not, by itself, make an organization ready.
Utility Inspection Is a Distinct Operating Environment
Utility drone operations do not fit neatly into a single operating model.
Depending on the client and the required level of detail, transmission and distribution inspections often require constant repositioning around towers, poles, conductors, vegetation, road crossings, and nearby structures. The required shot sheet ultimately dictates the level of detail and the flight pattern necessary to complete the inspection. Automation has not yet developed to the point where it can consistently deliver those results across every utility environment. Storm response often begins with a planned automated route but changes immediately when crews identify damaged facilities, access limitations, or conditions requiring closer inspection. Substation work is geographically confined while still requiring precise manual control near complex energized equipment.
All of these operations can involve BVLOS, but they don’t present the same risks or require the same level of automation.
This is one of the most important concerns raised by electric utility trade associations in response to the NPRM. They argued that manual control remains necessary for close-up inspections and emergency work, and that the final framework should preserve a practical pathway for pilot-in-the-loop BVLOS operations rather than forcing every mission into a highly automated model.
The reasonable distinction is this: the industry should not assume that every manually flown inspection deserves reduced oversight. It should, however, recognize the difference between an experienced pilot maneuvering around a pole a short distance beyond direct visual contact and a remotely supervised aircraft conducting a long autonomous flight across a large geographic area.
Both are BVLOS. They are not the same operation.
Utility rights-of-way also create a unique environment. Utilities generally know the terrain, maintain detailed asset records, control or regularly access many of the properties involved, and often have established procedures for ground crews, helicopters, contractors, environmental restrictions, and emergency response.
That knowledge should be considered in the risk assessment, but it does not eliminate the need to account for other airspace users, people on the ground, changing conditions, communications coverage, or aircraft failures.
A right-of-way is a useful operational control. It is not automatically sterile airspace.
The Low-Altitude Airspace Debate Is Not Resolved
The most difficult issue is not whether drones can fly beyond visual line of sight, but how drones and crewed aircraft will share the same low-altitude environment.
The proposed Part 108 framework includes shielded operations near certain infrastructure. The concept is that an unmanned aircraft operating close to a power line, structure, bridge, railroad, or similar feature is flying in an area that other aircraft would normally avoid. Under the proposal, that physical relationship can serve as part of the collision-risk mitigation strategy. From an operational standpoint, if crewed aircraft are flying at or below the height of utility towers and poles, the risk environment is already significantly more complex and implies that we have much bigger problems to worry about in that instance.
Our utility partners generally support the concept but have requested broader shielded areas and greater recognition of established utility corridors. They have also raised concerns about the practical and liability implications of requiring infrastructure owners to grant permission to other operators seeking to use shielded airspace near their facilities.
Manned aviation organizations see the issue differently. Their comments argue that crewed aircraft should retain right-of-way in all airspace, including shielded areas, and that BVLOS drones should be able to detect and avoid crewed aircraft regardless of where the operation occurs. They also question whether electronic-conspicuity equipment will be sufficiently defined, proven, and available before operators are required to depend on it.
Both positions reflect real operating concerns.
Utility helicopters, agricultural aircraft, firefighting resources, emergency aircraft, general aviation pilots, and drones all operate at low altitude. Power lines themselves can be difficult to see. Terrain can interfere with standard C2 communications and surveillance coverage. Not every crewed aircraft broadcasts ADS-B information, and not every unmanned aircraft will have an effective way to detect a non-cooperative aircraft.
The final rule will need to determine who must be electronically visible, who must yield, what level of detect-and-avoid performance is acceptable, and when infrastructure can reasonably be treated as a shielding feature.
The outcome will have a direct effect on cost. A shielded-operation provision that still requires expensive non-cooperative detect-and-avoid equipment will likely offer limited economic value. Conversely, a framework that relies too heavily on shielding without accounting for legitimate low-altitude aviation could create unacceptable risk.
This cannot be solved by simply declaring one side right. It will require defined equipment standards, practical right-of-way rules, and operating procedures that reflect how the airspace is actually used.
Responsibility Shifts From the Pilot to the Organization
Part 107 is largely built around the remote pilot in command. The pilot is certificated, evaluates the flight, maintains operational control, and is accountable for compliance.
The Part 108 proposal places considerably more emphasis on the operating organization.
Under the NPRM, operators would be required to designate an operations supervisor with responsibility for the overall safety of the operation. Flight coordinators would monitor individual aircraft and intervene when necessary. More complex certificated operators would be required to maintain a safety management system and an approved training program.
For utility programs, this raises questions that cannot be answered by the flight department alone:
- Is the utility the regulated operator, or is its inspection contractor?
- Who holds operational control when the utility defines the scope but the contractor controls the aircraft and flight crew?
- Who owns and maintains the operating manuals?
- Who qualifies flight coordinators and maintenance personnel?
- Who is responsible for reporting system failures, cybersecurity events, or operational deviations?
- Can a contractor use one organizational approval across several utility clients?
- What happens when the utility owns the aircraft, but a contractor operates and maintains it?
Today, these responsibilities are often divided across multiple business units and contracts. Part 108 will require them to be documented more clearly and brought under a unified contractual framework.
Aircraft manufacturers, many of which currently function primarily as system integrators, will also face significant hurdles within the changing regulatory environment. The proposed airworthiness acceptance process addresses design, software, electronic hardware, command-and-control systems, cybersecurity, production quality, continued operational safety, maintenance, batteries, flight-data recording, and configuration changes. Every piece of hardware and line of code integrated into the final system will affect compliance, product reliability, and the downstream operations of utilities and their contractors.
The additional aircraft weight and payload capacity also increase the consequences of a system failure. A 110- or 1,320-pound aircraft operating at speed carries substantially more energy than the small UAS used in most utility programs today. A lost command-and-control link, navigation failure, propulsion fault, software error, or uncontrolled flyaway can no longer be viewed primarily as the loss of an aircraft. It becomes a significant risk to people, property, other airspace users, and the infrastructure the aircraft was intended to inspect.
Manufacturers will need to design these systems for fault tolerance rather than nominal performance alone. That will require substantial improvements in the redundancy and independence of flight-critical electronics, power systems, navigation, command-and-control links, and flight-control functions. It will also require reliable fault detection and isolation, predictable lost-link behavior, containment within the approved operating area, and a safe method of discontinuing the flight when continued operation is no longer possible.
The NPRM reflects that expectation. It proposes that an aircraft execute a safe predetermined action when a C2 link reaches its timeout, remain controllable when external services or signals become unavailable, and discontinue a flight without creating an additional safety hazard. It also proposes that no single failure of the aircraft’s power system result in a loss of flight or control, and that a propulsion power failure cannot cause the aircraft to become uncontrollable.
Manufacturers would also have to evaluate probable failures involving propulsion, C2, GPS, flight-control components, control stations, and other associated elements to demonstrate that those failures will not result in a loss of flight or control. The proposal further calls for each make, model, and configuration to complete at least 150 failure-free flight-test hours in an operationally representative environment.
That level of assurance will require more than adding a second GPS receiver or backup radio. Manufacturers will need to demonstrate that redundant systems do not share the same failure point, that the aircraft can identify and isolate a malfunction, and that its response to a failure remains predictable under realistic operating conditions. As the aircraft become larger and carry more capable payloads, the safety architecture behind the platform will matter as much as its endurance, sensor capacity, or inspection performance.
Some current utility fleets may not transition cleanly into that structure. The utility associations have requested grandfathering and a defined transition period, noting that many current aircraft and waivers do not align with the proposed requirements.
That does not mean utilities should immediately replace their fleets. Until the final rule and accepted means of compliance are available, purchasing equipment advertised as “Part 108 ready” involves a considerable amount of speculation.
A better first step is to understand the fleet already in service: aircraft configurations, firmware control, lost-link behavior, command and control architecture, maintenance history, battery records, reliability data, manufacturer support, cybersecurity controls, and expected replacement dates.
The same applies to operational data. Flight logs, telemetry, maintenance records, pilot qualifications, incident records, and inspection imagery can, and likely will, become part of a formal compliance and continued operational safety system.
Utilities should understand where that information is stored, who can retrieve it, whether it is automatically uploaded to a manufacturer or software provider, and which party is responsible for retaining it. The utility comments correctly point out that indiscriminate flight-data sharing could expose operating patterns and information associated with critical infrastructure.
Other Regulatory Changes Utilities Need to Watch
Part 108 is not developing in isolation.
Proposed Part 146, included in the same rulemaking, would create an approval and oversight structure for automated data service providers. These providers are intended to support strategic deconfliction, conformance monitoring, operational-intent sharing, and other UAS Traffic Management functions associated with scalable BVLOS operations.
This could create an entirely new dependency layer for utility programs.
An aircraft may be capable of completing a mission, but the operation could still depend on the availability and coverage of an approved third-party service. Utilities and contractors will need to evaluate service outages, cybersecurity, geographic coverage, interoperability, data ownership, vendor lock-in, and contractual responsibility when a service provides incomplete or incorrect information.
BVLOS scalability depends as much on digital infrastructure as it does on the aircraft itself.
A separate FAA proposal published in May 2026 would allow operators of eligible fixed-site critical infrastructure to request flight restrictions around their facilities. Energy & Utilities is one of the eligible sectors, and the proposal would create standard and special restriction types with defined boundaries and enforcement mechanisms.
For electric utilities, the proposal is intended to help protect substations, generation facilities, dams, control centers, and other sensitive locations from unauthorized drone activity.
It will also create new administrative responsibilities. Utilities will need a process for determining which sites warrant restrictions, who submits and maintains the request, how approved contractors receive access, and how emergency inspections are handled.
Federal policy is therefore moving in two directions at once: enabling more routine BVLOS operations while creating stronger controls around sensitive infrastructure.
Utilities have to prepare for both.
Five No-Regrets Actions Utilities and Contractors Can Take Now
- Define operational control
Document who controls each operation, who can authorize or terminate a flight, and how responsibility is divided among the utility, prime contractor, drone service provider, aircraft manufacturer, and technology vendors.
Do not rely on assumptions embedded in existing contracts. Put the responsibilities in writing. - Inventory the complete operating system
The aircraft is only one component.
Document aircraft configurations, payloads, C2 links, cellular or radio dependencies, cloud services, detect-and-avoid capabilities, Remote ID equipment, software versions, data-transfer paths, maintenance systems, battery records, and third-party platforms.
This will make it much easier to perform a gap assessment when the final requirements are published. - Strengthen manuals and configuration management
Review operations manuals, emergency procedures, training records, maintenance procedures, incident reporting, change-control processes, and cybersecurity practices.
The goal should not be to guess the final Part 108 language. The goal is to ensure the organization can explain how the operation is controlled and how changes are evaluated. - Evaluate readiness by use case
Do not develop one generic BVLOS plan.
Separate distribution inspection, transmission corridors, substations, storm response, wildfire mitigation, remote operations, and one-to-many concepts. Each has a different mix of air risk, ground risk, automation, data, personnel, and technology requirements.
Determine where BVLOS creates enough operational value to justify the added infrastructure.
- Build a transition plan
Identify existing waivers, approval limits, expiration dates, fleet replacement schedules, contractual commitments, and upcoming inspection programs.
The final rule may or may not include a transition period, but utilities should not assume it will solve every compatibility issue. A practical plan should allow current operations to continue while the organization evaluates new approvals, aircraft, personnel structures, and service-provider requirements.
Prepare the Program, Plan for the Future
Part 108 has the potential to make utility BVLOS operations more repeatable, scalable, and practical across larger inspection programs. It could also help utilities establish standardized methods and procedures for corridor inspections, emergency response, access to difficult terrain, and broader infrastructure coverage with fewer field movements.
It also aims to raise the standard expected of operators.
As proposed, the framework would require more formal operational control, qualified aircraft, documented maintenance practices, clearly defined personnel roles, stronger cybersecurity controls, greater data governance, and increased reliance on supporting services that are still developing.
That does not make Part 108 a negative development. It means the industry needs to be realistic about what routine BVLOS operations will require.
The organizations best prepared for these changes will be the ones that can clearly explain who controls the operation, how aircraft are maintained, how airspace risk is managed, where operational data goes, and what happens when an aircraft, system, or supporting service fails.
For utilities and the contractors that support them, preparing for Part 108 starts with developing the long-term strategy that will define the operating model, governance, technology, and accountability behind the program.
Continue the Conversation
Part 108 will not affect every utility inspection program in the same way. The appropriate path forward will depend on each organization’s aircraft, existing approvals, inspection use cases, technology, risk tolerance, and division of responsibility between the utility and its contractors.
Think Power Solutions is actively involved in executing these changes and their practical effect on utility inspection operations. Utilities, contractors, aircraft manufacturers, and technology providers interested in discussing Part 108 readiness, operating-model development, or the future of utility BVLOS programs are encouraged to contact us.
Regulatory status note: This article reflects the FAA and TSA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and publicly available information as of July 30, 2026. The final rule is currently under federal review and has not yet been published. Final requirements, effective dates, and transition provisions may differ from the proposed framework.
Citations:
Federal Register — Normalizing Unmanned Aircraft Systems Beyond Visual Line of Sight Operations
OIRA — Pending EO 12866 Regulatory Review
Critical-infrastructure flight-restriction proposal
FAA — Restricting Drones Near Critical Infrastructure Sites
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